On War: Clausewitz’s Legacy

On War: Clausewitz’s Legacy

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On War: Clausewitz’s Legacy

Von Clausewitz, C., & Graham, J. J. (1873). On war (Vol. 1). London, N. Trübner & Company.

In “On the Nature of War”, Clausewitz reiterates the importance of approaching a subject, war in this case, in a holistic manner. The whole to him is greater than the some of its parts and enables theorists to present a more defined exposition on a circumstance. He defines war in its simplest term, a duel between two opposing parties bent on compelling the other, through the use of force, to submit. Violence is merely a tool towards the end goal, submission of opponent articulated by disarmament. Force is the norm rather than the exception in war. The one with more force emerges dominant and is predisposed to win from the onset. According to Clausewitz war is an extrapolation of the chaotic nature of politics. In a controversial statement he claims it is an extension of actualization of policy.

Keegan, J. (2011). A history of warfare. Random House.

Keegan an otherwise reputable author falls short of his potential in the book A History of Warfare. The author attempts to make the German, Clausewitz, obsolete implying that his readings are bent towards conquest without regard to reality. He departs from the liberal German’s overarching assertion that politics is an integral part of war. He further elucidates that World War I was a not byproduct of politics rather it developed organically without interference of the same. Unlike Clausewitz, he is an enemy of abstraction. Keegan confines himself to practical examples limiting the expanse of his strong themes. Unfortunately, the above approach invalidates his prophetic tendencies as his assertions are narrowly tailored for specific timelines and scenarios.

Shaw, G. B. (2004). Plays by George Bernard Shaw. Penguin.

“Arms and Man” is a play that puts Clausewitz points into context. It demystifies war in modern society by showing an emphasis on practicality and an intentional departure from aristocratic perspective on war. The aristocratic approach on war was romanticized with heroism. It was perceived as a means of achieving nobility, obscuring the cruel realities of war to both the conqueror and conquered. Shaw posits that it is often a pursuit in futility undertaken by irrational men.

Cohen, E. A., & Earle, E. M. (1997). Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler.

This collection of essays attempt to unite and contrast the theories of major historical proponents on war. The book documents the constant utility of strategy and war as a function of politics, society, and economics. The essays supplement each other in documenting the constancy of war’s dynamics in different environments. It also traces the lineage of strategy from the land mark wars in history, from the renaissance to the nuclear age. The essays intersect the primary assertions of war theorists with experience. The authors appropriate the works of Clausewitz and the unending words of key proponents like Churchill to illustrate their points. The book approaches strategy as tool of military power, dissecting its academic essence devoid of its practical implications.

Schelling, T. C. (2008). Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword. Yale University Press.

Arms and Influence by Thomas Schelling is the baseline for the theory of coercion isolated from its enduring connection with violence. Schelling, a key game theorist, approaches the war proponents as rational actors in order to properly define a theory. Akin to his predecessor Clausewitz, he strives to stick with abstract scenarios giving his concepts longevity. He is nonetheless in touch with reality. The book is a metamorphosis of Clausewitz concepts aligning them with modern realities. Schelling illustrated that the nuclear weapons gave the concept coercion of a paradigm shift. It completely changed the incentives of war decreasing its propensity. The book demarcates a new epoch where the origin of war in politics is accentuated; coercion becomes a tool of negotiation rather than war.

Van Creveld, M. (1986). The Eternal Clausewitz. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 9(2-3), 35-50.

In the “Eternal Clausewitz”, Martin van Creveld shows the relevance of Clausewitz in contemporary society arises from his commitment to abstraction. He emphasized the lack of constants in war. To him, war is unpredictable and dynamic hence beyond the scope of scientific principles. As such, generalization of concepts towards creating predictions is invalidated.

References

Cohen, E. A., & Earle, E. M. (1997). Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler.

Keegan, J. (2011). A history of warfare. Random House.

Schelling, T. C. (2008). Arms and Influence: With a New Preface and Afterword. Yale University Press.

Shaw, G. B. (2004). Plays by George Bernard Shaw. Penguin.

Van Creveld, M. (1986). The Eternal Clausewitz. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 9(2-3), 35-50.

Von Clausewitz, C., & Graham, J. J. (1873). On war (Vol. 1). London, N. Trübner & Company.